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INTRODUCTION
The Organized Crime Control Act of 19701 was enacted in re-
sponse to organized crime's increasing threat to the economic and
social welfare of the nation, and the inability of traditional criminal
procedures and sanctions to arrest this menace effectively.2 The Act
provides law enforcement officials with sharper legal tools for gather-
ing evidence and adds new substantive criminal prohibitions, more
effective sanctions, and other novel remedies to deal with the unlaw-
ful activities of those engaged in organized crime.'
The Organized Crime Control Act is composed of twelve separate
titles.4 This comment deals with Title IX,5 which is entitled Racket-
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
2. See id. §§ 101-1212, 84 Stat. 922, 923-62. See generally McClellan, The Or-
ganized Crime Act (S.30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 55, 57-60 (1970) (Senator McClellan, sponsor of the Organized Crime
Control Act, discussing the debilitating effects of organized crime and recognizing sev-
eral loopholes which the Act was designed to alleviate).
3. Organized Crime Conrol Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941, 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(1988) (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose). Often the penalties for a
violation of RICO are more severe than the penalties for the crimes which constitute the
definition of "racketeering activity." The RICO penalties include fines equal to twice the
gross profits or other proceeds from an offense, imprisonment for as long as 20 years, and
forfeiture of interests acquired or maintained in violation of RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)
(1982 & Supp. 1989).
RICO is exceptional in many respects. It is unusual not only because of its sweeping
nature, its incursions into state law, and its severe penalties, but also because of its at-
tempt to alter a traditional principle of statutory construction. This principle is that penal
statutes shall be subject to strict interpretation, or, at the very least, that their words
shall be given no more than normal meaning. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S.
396, 411 (1973). RICO, on the other hand, specifically provides that "provisions of this
title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." RICO, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947 (1971).
4. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1073-1121 (discussion of the Titles) (Title I-
Special Grand Jury; Title II- General Immunity (of witnesses); Title III- Recalcitrant
Witnesses; Title IV- False Declarations (before a grand jury or a court); Title V- Pro-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' A person
may fall within the ambit of RICO's prohibitions by engaging in one
or more of four activities: (1) using income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise in inter-
state or foreign commerce;7 (2) acquiring or maintaining an interest
in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;8 (3) con-
ducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity;9 or (4) conspiring to commit any of these offenses. 10 The
"pattern of racketeering activity"'" must include at least two predi-
cate acts'2 of "racketeering activity."' 3 The requirement of two pred-
icate acts is satisfied if there exists a violation of two or more ex-
isting state or federal offenses, "one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
tected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses; Title VI- Depositions; Title VII-
Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence; Title VIII- Syndicated Gambling; Title IX-
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations; Title X- Dangerous Special Of-
fender Sentencing; Title XI- Regulation of Explosives; Title XII- National Commission
on Individual Rights).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Title IX amends Title 18 of the U.S.C. by
adding chapter 96. For an interesting discussion of the evolution of RICO's legislative
development and judicial interpretation, see Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Crimi-
nal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661, 664-713 (1987).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
7. Id. § 1962(a).
8. Id. § 1962(b).
9. Id. § 1962(c).
10. Id. § 1962(d). For a defendant to be convicted of a RICO conspiracy violation,
the defendant need not have actually participated in any of the predicate crimes. United
States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520 (1st Cir. 1988). RICO is a continuing violation
statute, that is, "a member of a RICO enterprise is responsible for all the offenses com-
mitted by the enterprise regardless of whether he directly participated in each racketeer-
ing act." Id. at 524.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). The Supreme Court defined a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989). The
Court stated that "[i]t is not the number of predicate acts but the relationship that they
bear to each other or to some external organizing principle that renders them 'ordered' or
'arranged.'" Id. at 2900. The "plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering
predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity." Id. Examples the Court gave were: "a distinct threat of long-term racketeering
activity . . .; predicate acts or offenses are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of
doing business ...; [or] the predicates are a regular way of conducting defendant's
ongoing legitimate business . . . ." Id. at 2902.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). The defendant must be guilty of a "pattern of
racketeering activity," which requires at least two separate racketeering acts (often
called "predicate acts" or "predicate offenses"). "If convictions for all of the predicate
offenses underlying a RICO count are vacated, then the conviction for the RICO count
must also be vacated." United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989).
Additionally, it is improper to charge two predicate offenses when one act by the defend-
ant happens to violate two separate statutes. A pattern of racketeering activity requires
two acts, not two statutory offenses. Id.; see also United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d
842 (8th Cir. 1987).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) ("Racketeering activity" defined as certain predi-
cate acts including any act or threat involving any of nine specified state felonies or 47
specified federal offenses).
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ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commis-
sion of a prior act of racketeering activity."' 4 The commission of
these predicate offenses in conjunction with the "enterprise"' 5 forms
the basis for a RICO conviction.' 6
However, federal courts differ on whether a RICO conviction may
stand after some of a defendant's convictions for the predicate acts,
on which his RICO conviction is based, are vacated by a reviewing
court but at least two such convictions remain.' 7 The Fifth Circuit
(the majority view) will uphold a RICO conviction after a predicate
act is vacated on appeal, while the Third Circuit (the minority view)
will vacate the RICO conviction thereby avoiding an inconsistent
verdict with the lower court. Several problems arise due to this con-
flict among federal circuits. Routine dismissal of RICO convictions
in the minority view jurisdictions is unfair to defendants who are
14. Id. § 1961(5).
15. Id. § 1961(4). An "enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." Id. To be convicted of a RICO violation, the defendant
"1 'person' must be a separate and distinct entity from the 'enterprise.'" Schreiber Dist.
Corp. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986). A corporation
possesses an existence separate from its incorporator; therefore, a defendant cannot shield
himself from RICO by claiming that a corporate enterprise is an extension of himself.
United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1988).
A RICO enterprise also requires a common purpose and continuity. RICO requires
neither intentional nor purposeful behavior, rather it requires a common purpose which is
"proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that
the various associates function as a continuing unit." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 580 (1981); see United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussion
of the continuity concept).
Some courts hold that the enterprise must have an existence separate and apart from
the pattern of racketeering activity. For a Ninth Circuit discussion of the issue, see
United States v. Kirk, 844 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1988) and United Energy Owners
Comm., Inc. v. United States Energy Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d 356, 363 (9th Cir.
1988).
16. United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1988) outlined the five re-
quirements to prove a substantive RICO offense. They are: "(1) the existence of an en-
terprise; (2) the defendant's association with the enterprise; (3) the defendant's participa-
tion in the affairs of the enterprise; (4) a pattern of racketeering activity; and (5) the
enterprise's effect on interstate or foreign commerce." Id. at 1227.
Conviction for a violation of RICO results in severe criminal penalties and forfeiture of
illegal proceeds. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). A person found in a private civil action to
have violated RICO is liable for treble damages, costs, and attorneys fees. Id. § 1964(c).
A criminal conviction will allow for consecutive sentencing for a substantive RICO con-
viction and a RICO conspiracy conviction. For example, the defendants in United States
v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1988), were sentenced to consecutive 20 year
terms. The sentence withstood an eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment at-
tack. Id.
17. See McCulloch v. United States, 822 F.2d 63 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 947, 947 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
prosecuted in majority view jurisdictions because their defendant
counterparts in the minority view jurisdictions get their sentences
drastically reduced simply because of where the prosecutor decided
to prosecute the case. Allowing such unevenhanded administration of
RICO convictions not only prejudices certain defendants but also en-
courages prosecutors of multidistrict enterprises to forum shop. Pros-
ecutors whose RICO convictions are methodically reversed in the
minority view jurisdictions are also unduly burdened.
This comment begins by discussing the concept of verdict consis-
tency in a RICO conviction and then examines the judicial reasoning
supporting each of the two views in the federal circuits: the majority
view, which upholds the RICO conviction regardless of subsequent
court action on a predicate conviction; and the minority view, which
vacates the RICO conviction if a predicate offense is vacated on ap-
peal. This comment analyzes the two views to demonstrate that the
majority view is the more effective and concludes by discussing pos-
sible solutions to the problem through congressional reform of the
RICO Act.
I. RICO AND VERDICT CONSISTENCY
Inconsistent verdicts are a familiar phenomena which have re-
ceived the most attention when the jury itself returns inconsistent
verdicts. This Comment deals with inconsistent verdicts arising in a
different context: inconsistency resulting from the reversal of a predi-
cate offense on appeal. The legal theories concerning inconsistent
jury verdicts should apply to inconsistent verdicts resulting from ap-
pellate review.
Recently, in United States v. Powell,"8 the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the general rule that inconsistent verdicts may
stand. 9 The Powell Court followed the rule established in Dunn v.
United States, 0  in which the Supreme Court noted that
"[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary" 2' and "[t]he most that
can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal
or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but
that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's
guilt. '
22
The defendant in Dunn was tried pursuant to a three count indict-
ment charging violations of the federal liquor laws.23 The first count
18. 708 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1983) rev'g 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
19. Id.
20. 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (Holmes, J., citing Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59,
60 (1925)).
21. Id. at 393.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 391.
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alleged that the defendant had maintained a "common nuisance"2"
by selling alcohol; the second and third counts charged unlawful pos-
session and sale of alcohol." The jury convicted the defendant of the
first count and acquitted him of the second and third counts.26 The
Supreme Court rejected the claim that the defendant was entitled to
discharge because the verdicts were inconsistent by concluding that
although the jury has no legal "right" to return verdicts resulting
from compromise, it has the authority to do so.
27
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the Powell Court that "incon-
sistent verdicts-even verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense
while convicting on the compound offense-should not necessarily be
interpreted as a windfall to the government at the defendant's ex-
pense."' 28 This is because the government cannot petition for appel-
late re-evaluation regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, which
provides sufficient protection to a criminal defendant.2 9 Rehnquist
also noted that, because inconsistent verdicts may also support a
criminal defendant's case, there is adequate protection to prevent re-
view of such judgments at a defendant's request.30 Since this uncer-
tainty always exists and since an acquittal may not be challenged by
the government, it is unacceptable to permit new trials for defend-
ants as a common policy. 31 Also probable is "that the jury, convinced
of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense,
and then through mistake, compromise, or leni[ency], arrived at an
inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense."32
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 391-92.
27. Id. at 393. The Dunn rule was later invoked in United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943), to support a jury verdict finding the president of a corporation
guilty of introducing adulterated or misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, but ac-
quitting the corporation of the same charge. The rule was reaffirmed in Harris v. Rivera,
454 U.S. 339 (1981), which held that a defendant could not obtain relief by writ of
habeas corpus on the basis of inconsistent verdicts rendered after a state bench trial. In
Harris, the Supreme Court noted that Dunn and Dotterweich establish "the unreview-
able power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons." Id. at
346.
28. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
29. Id. at 64-67. The Court further noted that the government cannot attack an
inconsistent acquittal, even if palpably erroneous, because of the Constitution's double
jeopardy clause.
30. Id. at 65.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Powell Court also rejected an argument that would have permitted a
defendant to contest inconsistent verdicts on the basis that "some error [was] worked
against them." Id. at 66; see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) ("due process
does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compro-
The consistency question must also be considered when an incon-
sistency in verdicts arises after an appellate court reverses a predi-
cate offense upon which the jury may have relied in issuing a guilty
verdict on a RICO charge. Such a determination is crucial because
the predicate offense, of which the defendant obtained reversal, may
have been one of the two offenses necessary to prove the pattern of
racketeering activity. Juries usually issue general verdicts since spe-
cial verdicts are disfavored in criminal law.33 In a general verdict,
the jury does not specify which two predicate offenses satisfied the
"pattern" requirement. Thus it may be unclear after a reversal of
one of the convictions charged whether the jury used it to find the
requisite pattern to obtain the RICO conviction.
Although Powell deals with a jury itself initially returning an in-
consistent verdict, as opposed to a verdict whose basis is questioned
as a result of an appellate reversal of a predicate offense, this fact
should actually add to the strength of the majority view's argument
that the jury's decision on the RICO verdict should not be disturbed.
If we are not going to upset a jury verdict when the jury itself con-
trolled the inconsistency, why should the verdict be upset simply be-
cause the inconsistency was created by a decision of a reviewing
court?
The Ninth Circuit held, in United States v. McCall,34 that its role
in reviewing such cases is not to rationalize the jury's verdict or to
reconcile apparently inconsistent findings, rather, it only decides if
adequate evidence existed to support a guilty verdict.3 5 Since neither
rationality nor consistency is required by the jury verdict36 and the
mising situation"); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915) (once the jury has
heard the evidence and the case has been submitted, the litigants must accept the jury's
collective judgment). The Powell court said that "[s]uch an individualized assessment of
the reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or would
require inquiries into the jury's deliberations that courts generally will not undertake."
Powell, 469 U.S. at 66. The defendant in Powell had argued that the Dunn rule, which
allows a conviction to stand, should not apply where the defendant is acquitted of a
predicate offense but convicted on the compound offense. Id. at 67. Rehnquist concluded
that such an exception would "swallow the rule." Id. at 68.
33. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1178 (1975).
34. 592 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979).
35. Id. at 1068; see Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d
475, 482 (5th Cir. 1986) (court "under a constitutional mandate to search for a view of
the case that makes the jury's answers consistent") (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores
v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)); see also R.B. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 299
F.2d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 1962). The court in Armco reviewed the verdicts and reconciled
the irreconcilable by concluding the "most logical explanation [was] that the verdict was
the result of the trial judge's instructions regarding justifiable reliance." Armco, 782
F.2d at 482.
36. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932); see Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464, 472 (1958) (the leading case on the permissibility of inconsistent verdicts
in a criminal context: "jury verdicts are sometimes inconsistent or irrational"); see also
Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 485 (1933). In civil cases,
the rule is less clear. See, e.g., Bickel, Judge and Jury- Inconsistent Verdicts in the
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jury is presumed to have followed the court's instructions, 3 a rever-
sal of a RICO conviction upon reversal of a predicate offense would
involve an unwarranted and unwelcome intrusion into the jury's
deliberations.
Given most courts' hesitancy to probe the internal operations of a
jury, the double jeopardy clause which precludes acquittal review,
and the potential for jury leniency,38 the best policy is to shield jury
verdicts from appellate review3 9 and allow a jury's inconsistent ver-
dict in a criminal case to stand. 0 Such a rule allows a defendant to
be convicted on one count of a multiple count indictment and acquit-
ted on another count, even when the commission of one crime with-
out the other would have been impossible.4 ' The Powell Court rea-
soned that since a defendant receives a benefit upon an acquittal on
some counts it is "neither irrational nor illogical to require . . .[the
defendant] to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which
Federal Courts, 63 HARV. L. REV. 649, 654 (1950) ("[T]here is not in a civil case the
equivalent of a precedent such as Dunn ... to overrule in upsetting inconsistent ver-
dicts").
37. Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609, 615 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
964 (1964).
38. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1981) (suggesting that a codefendant
might have been acquitted due to some unexpressable lingering doubt, a misunderstand-
ing of legal standards, or simple leniency); see also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S.
10, 22-23 (1980) (considering the possibilities that the jury acquitted out of compassion
or that the government presented different evidence against the alleged cohort).
39. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1984). The Powell Court specifi-
cally stated, however, that it was not deciding the proper disposition of a case "where a
defendant is convicted of two crimes, where a guilty verdict on one count logically ex-
cludes a finding of guilty on the other." Id. at 69 n.8.
40. Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 804 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 797 (3d Cir. 1987). The court stated:
[A]lthough ... [the defendant] was acquitted of perjury, there is ample evi-
dence that he testified untruthfully at the federal grand jury proceedings. In-
consistency of the verdicts does not necessarily mean that the jury did not con-
sider the evidence of perjury in deciding whether a conspiratorial act had
occurred . . . .[The] jury verdicts in criminal cases will stand, despite internal
inconsistencies, so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.
Id.; see United States v. Andrews, 850 F.2d 1557, 1561 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Consistent
verdicts are unrequired in joint trials for conspiracy: where all but one of the charged
conspirators are acquitted, the vetdict against the one can stand.").
41. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69; see also Harris, 454 U.S. at 345 ("[i]nconsistency in a
verdict is not a sufficient reason for setting it aside . . .[both] with respect to inconsis-
tency between verdicts on separate charges against one defendant" (citing Dunn v.
United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)) and "also with respect to verdicts that treat code-
fendants in a joint trial inconsistently" (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 279 (1943)). See generally Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932) ("ver-
dicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters").
the jury convicted. '42
II. DIVISION AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to a RICO case in
which one of the predicate offenses, but not all, had been vacated
upon appellate review.4 3 The court below had followed a prior deci-
sion of the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Peacock.44 The Peacock
court had vacated several convictions for predicate acts committed
by three RICO defendants, but concluded that when "each of the
appellants were properly convicted by the jury of at least two racke-
teering acts which were related to the . . . enterprise," 45 their RICO
convictions remain valid. The Fifth Circuit recognized that this hold-
ing conflicted with the Third Circuit's decision in United States v.
Brown.
46
In Brown,47 the Third Circuit reversed two defendants' RICO con-
victions when two of their four convictions for predicate acts were
invalidated upon review. The Ninth Circuit 48 has recognized this
conflict, but has declined to adopt either position to date. The Sev-
enth Circuit recently attempted to dispel the conflict by stating that
the Brown decision contained
no suggestion that the jury would have been acting irrationally if it had
acquitted the defendant of the racketeering charge even though two predi-
cate offenses were properly proved; whereas in both [a previous Seventh
Circuit case4" and the Peacock decision], where racketeering convictions
were upheld, the jury would have been acting irrationally to have done
this.50
The Seventh Circuit doubted whether the Brown jurisdiction
"would overturn the conviction in such a case" and if such a conjec-
ture was correct then there would be no conflict.5 '
42. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69. The court also relied on the fact that Dunn had with-
stood exception for 53 years.
43. McCulloch v. United States & Jones v. United States, 822 F.2d 63 (Ilth Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947 (1987) (Justice White and Justice Brennan dissented).
44. 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
45. Id. at 348.
46. 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
47. Id.
48. United States v. Lopez, 803 F.2d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 481
U.S. 1030, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1012 (1987) (Court recognized both Brown and Pea-
cock, but concluded that even assuming Brown was correct, other grounds precluded
reversal of the RICO conviction).
49. United States v. Anderson, 809 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (7th Cir. 1987). This court
avoided the applicability of a rule consonant with Peacock by holding that the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed each of the substantively
charged predicate acts. The court said that it was not faced with the question that would
arise if the evidence was sufficient only as to some of the substantively charged acts.
50. United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1351 (7th Cir. 1988).
51. Id. The Holzer court reversed the RICO count calling it a "crazy-quilt" since
the predicate federal crimes were not separately charged and eligible separately charged
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However, such reasoning is an oversimplification. It fails to con-
sider that a jury may still be acting rationally when it acquits on the
RICO count while upholding the predicate acts. The jury simply
may not have found the required pattern of racketeering activity or
the required nexus with an enterprise to uphold the RICO count.
A. The Brown Rule (Minority View),
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Brown, agreed with
the defendant's argument that the racketeering counts required re-
versal as a matter of law if one of the predicate offenses was reversed
on appeal.52 The Brown court followed the reasoning of United
States v. Dansker53 in which "defendants were charged in one count
with a conspiracy to bribe" two individuals, Ross and Serota. The
district court directed that if the unlawful objective of the claimed
conspiracy was to bribe either Ross or Serota that the jury may con-
vict the defendants.54 The jury received the conspiracy charge
(Count I) on two alternate theories.55 The jury came back with a
general verdict of guilty on the conspiracy count.56 Since the general
verdict only stated the jury's conclusion, it was impossible upon ap-
peal to determine which of the alternative theories formed the basis
of the jury's resolution.57 Counts II and III charged the defendants
with the bribery of Ross and Serota.5 8 The appellate court held that
there was insufficient evidence at the trial level to justify a conviction
for bribing Serota (Count III), but that the evidence was sufficient
to convict the defendants of bribing Ross (Count II). 9
The defendants argued that because of the appellate court's deci-
sion to reverse on Count III (bribery of Serota), it was impossible to
ascertain whether the government had properly charged and estab-
lished the conspiracy count. 60 The defendants argued that their con-
victions may have been based exclusively on the grounds that they
had conspired to bribe Serota and that if such was the case their
crimes were not charged as RICO predicate offenses. Id. at 1352. The court concluded
that the RICO count had "fallen into the cracks" and must be vacated. Id.
52. United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978).
53. 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976).




58. Id. at 44.
59. Id. at 40.
60. Id. at 51.
convictions must be reversed because such a verdict would be
inconsistent.
61
The government responded that since the jury concluded that de-
fendants collectively had bribed Ross (Count II), the jury must have
also resolved that the "Ross bribe (Count II) was at least one of the
conspiracy's objectives" (Count I). Therefore, the conspiracy convic-
tion was not threatened by the appellate court's reversal of the Ser-
ota bribery charge.62
The Dansker court rejected this argument because the "crime of
conspiracy is separate and distinct from the related substantive of-
fense."' 63 Therefore, a jury could quite possibly conclude that an al-
leged conspiracy is "non-existent" while simultaneously convicting
the defendants of the underlying crimes charged.64 The court re-
versed the conspiracy conviction and remanded for a new trial, rea-
soning that "the possibility remains, albeit slim, that the jury found
that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to bribe Serota alone
(Count III) in spite of its guilty verdict on (Count II)."65
In Brown, the defendants were convicted of extortion, three counts
of mail fraud, a RICO section 1962(b) violation, and a RICO sec-
tion 1962(d) violation. 6 The four substantive counts were charged as
predicate acts of the RICO counts. The Brown court reversed two
counts of mail fraud for insufficient evidence; the defendants then
made the same argument as the Dansker defendants.
6 7
They argued that because the general verdict made it impossible
"to determine upon which two counts the jury relied in returning a
guilty verdict" under the RICO section 1962(b) and section 1962(d)
violations, the RICO counts should be vacated.6 8 The substantive of-
fenses charged as predicate acts were distinct and hence it was ar-
guably impossible to determine from the verdict which offenses the
jury relied upon for finding the necessary pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity. The court agreed with the defendants that if they had re-
versed any of the other substantive counts, then reasoning analogous






66. United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 661 (3d Cir. 1978). A section 1962(b)
violation forbids "any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain ... any interest in ... any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988). A § 1962(d) violation forbids "any person to conspire to vio-
late any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section." Id. § 1962(d).
67. Brown, 583 F.2d at 661.
68. Id. at 669.
69. Id.
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reasoning was that the possibility existed that the jury may have de-
pended on either of the two counts reversed for insufficient evidence
to reach its guilty verdict on the two RICO counts.7 0
Some courts have distinguished Brown when the predicate act that
is reversed is a conspiracy to commit one of the substantive predicate
acts. If the conspiracy counts cover the substantive offenses charged
as predicate acts and, as long as there are convictions on the remain-
ing substantive predicate acts which occurred in the conduct of the
enterprise, the court will not vacate the RICO count.7 1 Where the
jury believed that the conspiracy was a part of the enterprise, the
reviewing court will conclude that the substantive offenses of the
conspiracy were likewise part of the enterprise.
B. The Peacock Rule (Majority View)
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Peacock,2 faced a fact situation similar to that in Brown and upheld
the RICO conviction. The indictment had charged the Peacocks with
twenty-four counts including "racketeering, 18 U.S.C. [section]
1962(c) [Count 1], mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. [section] 1510 [Counts 2-
23], and obstruction of justice, [Count 24]." ' ' a The appellants argued
that, because the jury gave a general verdict of guilty against each
appellant on Count I (the RICO count), if the appellate court were
to reverse any of the predicate racketeering acts "the Court must
also reverse [the RICO Count] because it is impossible to determine
upon which two counts the jury relied in returning a guilty ver-
dict.' 74 The court then addressed the Brown decision and Brown's
reliance upon Dansker, stating that even if Dansker was decided cor-
rectly, the situation here was different:
[The] danger, if any, in a conspiracy case alleging several objectives is that
70. Id.
71. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
73. Id. at 340. "The racketeering enterprise was, in essence, an arson ring." Id. at
341. This enterprise's pattern of racketeering activity "included ten arsons, one murder,
twenty-two mail frauds (these are the same twenty-two mail frauds which were charged
substantively in Counts 2-23) and an act of obstruction of justice which involved two
additional murders." (this was also Count 24). Id.
74. Id. at 348 (this was the argument in Brown). But see United States v. Mandel,
862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989) (if one of the two
predicate offenses underlying a substantive RICO count is vacated, the RICO count
must also be vacated); United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1352 (7th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Truglio,
731 F.2d 1123, 1132 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1984).
if one of the objectives is not supported by evidence, it cannot be deter-
mined whether or not the jury's verdict of guilty rested upon its conclusion
that the defendants had an objective which can be supported by the evi-
denceO (that is, there is a sufficiency of evidence problem that would re-
quire reversal of the conspiracy count).
The Peacock court distinguished Dansker by reasoning that a con-
viction under RICO section 1962(c) is unlike a Dansker conspiracy
situation. A section 1962(c) 76 charge requires (1) the defendant be
convicted of two racketeering acts and (2) "the two or more predi-
cate crimes . . . be related to the affairs of the enterprise but...
not [that they] be related to each other. 177 Therefore, no sufficiency
of evidence problem arises. However, in a conspiracy situation, the
crime of conspiracy is separate and distinct from the related substan-
tive offense.
The Peacock court concluded that, as long as the jury convicted
the defendants of at least two racketeering acts "which were related
to the enterprise, "78 the RICO count would stand.79 The court then
upheld the RICO count despite reversing one defendant's arson con-
viction (Count 1, 3(a)) and the other two defendants' murder (Count
75. Peacock, 654 F.2d at 348.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) states:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlaw-
ful debt.
Id.
77. Peacock, 654 F.2d at 348 (quoting United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d. 880, 889
n.23 (5th Cir. 1978)); see United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1009 n.55 (5th Cir.
1981) (congressional intent dictates that RICO and its predicate acts are separate and
distinct). Thus, Phillips held that a "defendant could [properly] be convicted for the
predicate acts which form the [pattern of racketeering activity] basic to a RICO charge,
and later [be prosecuted] under RICO." Id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d
1358, 1367 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1980)); United States v. Aleman, 609
F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
78. Peacock, 654 F.2d at 348.
79. United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981); see United States v.
Corona, 885 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1989) (affirms the Peacock rule); see also United
States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974). The court in Parness decided it is not
necessary to indict a person specifically for a predicate act in order to charge the person
under RICO, although it is necessary to specify the predicate acts in the RICO indict-
ment. Peacock, 654 F.2d at 441. For example, if a person engages in a fraud scheme for
which two acts of mail fraud are the predicate offenses, it is not necessary to issue a
three count indictment charging two counts of mail fraud and one RICO count; a single
RICO count is sufficient. However, in practice, prosecutors usually indict for predicate
offenses as well as for RICO. The Parness court agreed that the reversal of a predicate
offense did not justify interfering with the jury's deliberations. The defendant was con-
victed of interstate "transportation of stolen property" (2 counts), "causing a person to
travel in interstate commerce in furtherance of a scheme to defraud" (one count), and a
RICO section 1962(b) violation. Id. The court decided that "a conviction on any two of
[the three alleged acts of racketeering] was sufficient to establish the necessary pattern of
racketeering activity," and sustain a RICO conviction for acquiring an enterprise affect-
ing interstate or foreign commerce. Id.
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1, 3(1)) and related mail fraud (Counts 16-23) convictions. The
court reasoned that due to the jury's use of special verdict forms and
due to its verdict on Counts 2-24, the jury had sufficiently indicated
each defendant was convicted "of at least two racketeering acts
which were related to the arson enterprise." 80 Additional support for
the court's holding was evidenced from the fact that "a RICO con-
spiracy is by definition broader than an ordinary conspiracy to com-
mit a discrete crime." ' A RICO conspiracy is broader because each
RICO conspiracy participant need only conspire to take part in the
operation of the alleged enterprise by engaging in two predicate
crimes8 2 and because "unrelated crimes" by others who engage in
the enterprise's activities qualify as components of the RICO
conspiracy.8"
A recent Tenth Circuit case upheld a RICO conviction because it
was "assured by the separate convictions [on other substantive
counts] that the jury had found defendant guilty of committing at
least two of the predicate acts necessary for conviction."8 The Tenth
Circuit was adhering to dicta set forth in United States v. Weis-
man,85 in which the defendants sought reversal of their RICO counts
because they believed that some of the conspiracy counts were im-
properly considered as predicate acts. However, since the separate
substantive crimes were also charged in the RICO count as predicate
acts, the court had available at least two predicate acts.
C. Reconciliation of the Conflict
When a particular fact situation exists it is possible to reconcile
the conflicting viewpoints. If it is clear that the RICO conviction is
amply supported by the jury's finding of numerous other "legally
sufficient" predicate acts, the RICO conviction will be upheld in
both jurisdictions. For example, if the predicate acts were also sub-
stantively charged offenses, and the defendant was convicted of all,
80. Peacock, 654 F.2d at 348; see United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 670 n.21
(5th Cir. 1986) (court held that the reversal of one of the four predicate acts did not
affect the RICO conviction). The jury convicted the defendant of one other predicate
offense and he had previously been convicted of another. Therefore, "even if the jury
disbelieved the evidence of the third ... the requisite two nevertheless remain." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988).
84. Colorado Interstate Gas v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir.
1989).
85. 624 F.2d 1118, 1124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
then the court is not left to speculate as to the grounds for the sub-
stantive RICO conviction. The court in United States v. Brennan86
analyzed this fact situation. In Brennan, fourteen Travel Act offenses
were separately charged as substantive counts against the defendant
and also served as predicate acts for the RICO count. The court
stated that "the separate Travel Act counts 'operated like special
verdicts; by finding guilt on (all) those counts the jury also found
that [the predicate acts] had been shown.' "I'
The Third Circuit (the Brown jurisdiction), in United States v.
Zauber,88 recognized this distinction. In Brown, it was impossible to
ascertain on which predicate acts the jury had based the RICO con-
viction. However, in the case before it, the court concluded that the
defendants were convicted of enough predicate acts to affirm the
RICO conviction.89 Therefore, in situations where the substantive
counts and the predicate acts of the RICO count are closely related
or identical, both jurisdictions will uphold the RICO conviction. The
substantive convictions are utilized as a type of special verdict to
reconstruct what the jury must have concluded.
D. Comparison to the Double Jeopardy Issue
Anyone convicted of a RICO offense, by the definition of "racke-
teering activity," will also be found to have committed the predicate
offenses on which the RICO charge was based. To illustrate, if the
predicate offenses of the RICO charge are two acts of mail fraud
and the defendant is found guilty, then the defendant has not only
committed a RICO offense but has also committed two acts of mail
fraud. It is common practice to indict persons for both the RICO
offenses and the predicate offenses using separate counts for each.
This raises the issue of whether a conviction violates the constitu-
tional rule against double jeopardy9" or the rules against
multiplicity."
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in. United States v.
Hampton,92 discussed Congress's intentions in enacting the RICO
86. 867 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1750 (1989).
87. Id. at 115; see also United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 668 (11th Cir. 1984).
88. 857 F.2d 137, 151-54 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub. nom. Scotto v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989).
89. Id. at 151-54.
90. "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
91. Multiplicity is charging the same defendant for a single offense in several
counts. United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889, 895 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom.
Bertman v. United States, 459 U.S. 993 (1982) and cert. denied sub. nom. DeSantis v.
United States, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982). It is distinguished from "duplicity" which is the
joining in a single count of two or more distinct and separate offenses.
92. 786 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1986) (court upheld consecutive sentences for appel-
lant for substantive RICO violations and the underlying predicate acts).
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provisions with regard to the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment. 93 The court stated:
[The] purpose of this Act [was] to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gather-
ing process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing en-
hanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime."4
The court analyzed RICO's "statutory framework and legislative
history" and asserted Congress had indicated its intent that RICO
impose enhanced sanctions. It found allowance of "cumulative pun-
ishment for substantive RICO violations and the underlying predi-
cate acts" served the congressional purpose of providing new and
greater penal prohibitions.95 Accordingly, there was no multiplicity
in convicting and sentencing a defendant separately on both the
RICO count and the substantive counts.96
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Rone,97 addressed the argu-
ment that a defendant is placed in double jeopardy either when a
93. Id. at 970-80; see also United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283-86 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub. nora. Robinson v. United States, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987)
(admission of two prior convictions as RICO predicate offenses does not violate the
double jeopardy clause); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
94. Hampton, 786 F.2d at 980 (citing The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (emphasis added by the court)). Another common
rationale is that even though both charges arise out of the same conduct, the RICO
offense has the added element of a "pattern"; the government must prove at least two
separate instances of racketeering activity.
95. Id.; see United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 991-92 (1lth Cir.), reh'g de-
nied, 688 F.2d 852 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170, cert. denied sub. nom. Treasure
Isle, Inc. v. United States, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983); see also United States v. Hawkins, 658
F.2d 279, 288 (5th Cir. 1981) (a RICO offense may be based in part upon a predicate
offense for which the defendant has already been convicted and served a sentence).
96. United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
833 (1980) (the multiplicity argument is "unpersuasive on both statutory and constitu-
tional grounds").
97. 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nom. Little v. United
States, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932),
states that the statutory offenses must be examined to ascertain "whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. In Rone, if the section 1962(c)
RICO charge had exclusively consisted of the two extortions, Blockburger problems
might have arisen. Rone, 598 F.2d at 571. However, in Rone, the jury found defendants
guilty of three murders in addition to the two acts of extortion. See also Braverman v.
United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942), in which the court stated that one conspiratorial
agreement generally equals one conspiracy, regardless of the number or diversity of its
objectives. But, when the conduct in question violated two separate conspiracy statutes,
the Supreme Court, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788
(1946), permitted conviction under section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act, even
though the defendants made only one agreement.
RICO conviction is based upon a predicate crime for which the de-
fendant has already been punished due to a prior conviction or when
the defendant might be punished due to a contemporaneously
charged substantive (predicate) offense.98 The Rone defendants ar-
gued "consecutive sentences" were inappropriate for a substantive
RICO violation and for their extortion violations because the extor-
tion charges also counted as predicate offenses for the RICO count.99
The Ninth Circuit held that "It]here is nothing in the RICO statu-
tory scheme which would suggest that Congress intended to preclude
separate convictions or consecutive sentences for a RICO offense and
[for] the underlying or predicate crimes which make up the racke-
teering pattern."'100 Congress specifically stated that "nothing in this
title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law im-
posing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to
those provided for in this title."'u0
The preceding cases and provisions indicate that Congress in-
tended broad application of the RICO Act and courts have sustained
convictions where the appeal has addressed the double jeopardy is-
sue. It seems unusual to presume, as the Brown court did, that Con-
gress intended to limit the application of RICO and go against tradi-
tional jurisprudence regarding verdict consistency simply because of
the nature of RICO. There is nothing in RICO's text that suggests
that a rule other than the traditional rule should govern RICO jury
verdicts.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO DISMISSING THE RICO COUNT
A. Specific Findings Required
By a two to one majority, in United States v. Coonan,10 2 the Sec-
ond Circuit approved a proposed jury charge allowing specific find-
ings in a RICO case in which the RICO count consisted of "thirty-
two predicate acts of racketeering activity.' 0 3 The jury instructions
98. Rone, 598 F.2d at 571. An example of the former would be when a defendant
was previously convicted for the crime of extortion and now that same act of extortion is
being used by the prosecution as a possible predicate act to support a subsequent RICO
charge. An example of the latter would be when a defendant is charged concurrently
with the substantive crime of extortion and also a RICO count which is supported by
that same act of extortion as is charged in the substantive extortion count.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Hampton, 786 F.2d 977, 980 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing The
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat 923).
102. 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988).
103. Id. at 886-87. The racketeering activities included "eight murders, three at-
tempted murders, five conspiracies to commit murder, four kidnappings, and various acts
of loansharking, extortion, narcotics trafficking, illegal gambling, mail fraud, and coun-
terfeiting." Id.
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defined a RICO enterprise, membership in the enterprise, and in-
structed that the enterprise must have influenced interstate com-
merce."' The jury was to be instructed concerning the predicate acts
of the RICO count which had not been dismissed, the parties' con-
tentions regarding those predicate acts, and the requirement that the
predicate acts be "related to the enterprise."'10 5 However, the jury
was not to be required to decide whether any defendant joined in
enterprise activities "through a pattern of racketeering activity."'
0 6
Instead of rendering a general verdict, the jury would utilize spe-
cial verdicts to indicate if the government had established (1) mem-
bership in the enterprise, (2) that the enterprise existed, and (3) cul-
pability beyond a reasonable doubt regarding each predicate
offense.' 0 7 The trial judge would then deduce any RICO culpability
"mechanically" from the jury's decree.'08 For example, if the jury
found both the existence of an enterprise and the defendant's mem-
bership therein, the trial judge would determine the guilt or inno-
cence on the RICO counts "merely by counting the number of predi-
cate acts found by the jury to have been committed by each
defendant."'1 9 However, only with the defendant's consent could
such an instruction be given. 1 0 In this case, the defendant agreed
but the government objected arguing that the proposed instruction
constituted an extraordinary seizure of control by the jury."' The
government claimed a "right to a general verdict.""" It also claimed
the instruction intruded "upon its jury-trial rights" because the jury
was not instructed regarding "the existence of a 'pattern of racke-
teering activity.' "113
The Second Circuit provided an alternate solution which ad-
104. Id. at 893.
105. Id. at 887; see Beck v. Mfg. Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 1030 (1988).
106. Coonan, 839 F.2d at 888.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988); United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 189-93 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987) ("the government must prove that the defend-
ant committed at least two ... predicate acts"). In Coonan, the trial judge adopted the
special findings charge because he thought it would be "beneficial to defendants." 839
F.2d at 888. He stated that if a jury is told that they have to find two predicate acts to
find a defendant guilty of a RICO count that the jury would step back and think that if
they need two acts they had better be careful not to acquit on other predicate acts. Id.
110. Coonan, 839 F.2d at 888.
111. Id. at 889.
112. Id.
113. Id.
dressed some of the government's concerns."1 4 The court suggested
bifurcating jury deliberations into two phases: first, participation in
the predicate offenses; and second, guilt on the RICO count itself."n
The jury would respond to special interrogatories regarding the pred-
icate offenses before being advised that two predicate acts were re-
quired for a RICO conviction."' Subsequently, the jury would be
instructed as to the definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity"
and the need for the "existence of an enterprise." They would then
arrive at a general verdict on the RICO count." 7 Such a procedure
allows any defendant found not to have committed at least two pred-
icate acts to be acquitted on the RICO count after the jury's first
phase of deliberations. This procedure also removes the "possibility
...of obtaining guilty [RICO] verdicts through prejudicial spil-
lover from the numerous violent and otherwise criminal acts before
[the jury]."""
The dissent in Coonan argued special verdicts usurp the jury's his-
toric function" 9 and conflict with the law's historical preference for
general verdicts which is due to the exceptional protections conferred
upon criminal defendants. 20 The dissent considered several factors
underlying the law's distaste for specific findings: (1) fear that ex-
tracting a "yes" or "no" may drive a juror to mechanically infer
guilt when an acquittal may have been generated by "a more gener-
alized" evaluation; 12 and (2) the potential that dividing a RICO
count into several subparts may provide a split jury the occasion to
settle its divergence to the detriment of the defendant, indicating
"yes" to some offenses and "no" to others, when a consolidated de-
termination of the RICO count may have yielded "an acquittal or at
least a hung jury."'
22
B. Special Verdicts
Special verdicts, like the previous solution, eliminate the consis-




117. Id. at 889-90. The court stated that while the "proposed charge does not ei-
ther refer to 'patterns' or require the jury to count the number of predicate acts proven
against each defendant, the charge would not remove any actual factfinding from the
province of the jury." Id. at 889 n.3.
118. Id. at 890.
119. See id. at 893 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 897; see also United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (Ist Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970) (some condemn interrogatories because they
may impair an opportunity the jury is not told it has).
121. Coonan, 839 F.2d at 897 (dissent, citing United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d
913, 927 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977)).
122. Id. at 899.
[VOL. 27: 183, 1990] RICO Predicate Offense
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
jury to a series of questions submitted by the court, 12 and are gener-
ally accepted in the civil arena. Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows special verdicts in federal civil cases at the
discretion of the court. 24 The purpose of a rule 49(a) special verdict
is to avoid "confusion,"' 2 5 appellate skepticism, and the necessity for
further proceedings by identifying the bases upon which the jury
rendered its verdict.'26 In cases involving multiple, alternative theo-
ries of recovery, the special verdict has been described as a "wonder
to behold.'
127
The use of a special verdict in multiple theory of recovery cases
eliminates the uncertainty as to whether the jury's verdict was
wholly based on an improper theory requiring retrial of the case as
may occur with a general verdict. In addition, a special verdict also
"reveals the whole case for what it is, both fact and law, for com-
plete and final acceptance of the correct legal theory by the review-
ing court."' 28 Because general verdicts consist of numerous factual
variables, designing unobjectionable jury instructions is an arduous
responsibility, especially those which set forth "alternative
mandatory general verdicts if specific facts" are established.12 9
123. See Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1985).
124. See Loffiand -Bros. Co. v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1040 (1968). The trial court also has discretion over the nature and
scope of the issues submitted to the jury. This discretion is limited, however, if special
interrogatories are used such that the trial court "must submit all material issues raised
by the pleadings and the evidence." Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566 F.2d 551, 555 (5th
Cir. 1978).
125. Jamison Co., Inc. v. Westvaco Corp., 526 F.2d 922, 935 (5th Cir. 1976); see
also Jurors Say They Were Confused: DeLorean Acquittal Fuels Furor, Nat'l L.J., Jan.
12, 1987, at 3 (former automaker John Z. DeLorean was acquitted of federal racketeer-
ing charges. After the trial the jurors told the judge that they had misunderstood the
instructions and that three of them were still convinced of Delorean's guilt.).
126. Jamison, 526 F.2d at 935; see also United States v. Torres-Lopez, 851 F.2d
520, 523 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1144 (1989) (illustration of the use of a
special verdict form in determining the predicate acts upon which the jury relied).
127. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338, 344
(1967).
128. Id. at 345.
129. See Structural Rubber Prod. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 723
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (example of a case where a special verdict form would be helpful: a 14
month trial; 54 verdicts; 215 articles of evidence; summations consumed 4 days; jury
deliberated 38 days; and the trial transcript totaled 46,802 pages). The use of special
verdicts in federal courts generally has been confined to complex cases. See also Envirex,
Inc. v. Ecological Recovery Assoc., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1329, 1339-40 (M.D. Pa. 1978),
affd mem., 601 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979) (special verdict procedure localizes evidentiary
problems in complicated cases and allows the jury to direct its focus to specific factual
issues). For a discussion of the special verdict practice under Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
Although special verdicts are generally discouraged in criminal
cases as an intrusion upon the jury's functions, they are sanctioned
in criminal forfeiture cases1 30 under rule 31(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 31 Courts have been reluctant to use special
verdicts in regular criminal trials for two reasons. 32 First, the crimi-
nal jury's duty does not stop at factfinding. 133 Second, the courts see
the special verdict as judicial encroachment upon the jury's
function. 34
However, the Supreme Court has upheld special verdicts in capital
punishment cases.23 5 The Court stated it has never held:
cedure rule 49(a), see 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2505 (1971 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter C. WRIGHT].
130. Criminal forfeiture "is an in personam proceeding against a defendant in a
criminal case and is imposed as a sanction against the defendant upon his conviction." S.
REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 193, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN,
NEWS 3182, 3376. In contrast, civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding against the prop-
erty that the government seeks to obtain, without regard to the guilt or innocence of the
property owner "because the theory is that the property itself has committed the wrong."
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1486 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing to Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974)).
131. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) states: "If the indictment or the information alleges
that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be
returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any." The
note of the Advisory Committee on Rules states that 31 (e) is "intended to provide proce-
dural implementation of the recently enacted criminal forfeiture provision of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title IX, § 1963 [which is the criminal penalties sub-
section of RICO] and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, Title II, § 408(a)(2)." The draft assumes that "the amount of interest or property
subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense to be alleged and proved." FED.
R. CRIm. P. 7(c)(2) advisory committee note. Special verdicts are exceptional in criminal
cases, but they do exist. See United States v. Torres-Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 523 (1st Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1144 (1989) (a reproduction of a special verdict form'and
an illustration of how it simplified the reviewing court's function); United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969) (especially footnote 41 where authorities are cited);
see also United States v. Washington, 782 F.2d 807, 822-24 (9th Cir. 1986) (alternative
special verdict form).
132. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 128, § 512.
133. Id.
134. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969). The Spock court
argued that a court should allow the jury to act as the "conscience of the community" by
permitting the jury to "look at more than mere logic" and that by allowing special ver-
dicts the jury is discouraged from tempering rules of law with common sense and fair-
ness. Id. at 182. (Consider why this court assumes a jury cannot likewise temper rules of
law with a sense of fairness as it responds to each interrogatory of the special verdict?)
Cf. United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023
(1976); see also United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 927 (1980). The court allowed a special verdict in Huber not only in regard to
the rule 31(e) forfeiture provision, but also for the determination of the defendant's inter-
est in the enterprise and for identifying membership in the enterprise.
135. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 168-69 n.1 (1988). The Special Is-
sues that went to the jury asked whether it found "from the evidence beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that [the murder] was committed deliberately and with a reasonable expecta-
tion that the death would result?" and whether there was a "probability that [petitioner]
• . . would constitute a continuing threat to society?" Id. The petitioner argued that this
statement alone to the jury limited the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence in
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jury discretion [is to] be unlimited or unguided; we have never suggested
that jury consideration of mitigating evidence must be undirected or un-
focused; we have never concluded that States cannot channel jury discretion
in capital sentencing in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable
administration of the death penalty.13
A special verdict will be upheld in the sentencing phase of a capital
case if the jury is permitted to weigh mitigating factors and any ex-
ceptional attributes of the defendant, thereby affording the jury
some discretion.3 7
If the Supreme Court is willing to allow special verdicts in so seri-
ous a matter as a capital punishment, when one is especially con-
cerned with fairness to the criminal defendant, there seems to be no
reason the special verdict can not also be utilized in criminal RICO
trials. Of course, the issues would have to be framed so as to afford
the defendant procedural safeguards while not limiting RICO's
breadth.
Special verdicts in all criminal RICO cases would serve such a
dual purpose. First, they would allow a reviewing court to uphold a
RICO conviction when one is justified, rather than simply reversing
because of uncertainty pertaining to the predicate acts on which the
jury relied for conviction. Upholding the conviction also serves to up-
hold Congress's intent by not limiting RICO's effectiveness. The sec-
ond advantage of special verdicts in a RICO case is that they protect
a criminal defendant when used in a manner to insure the jury uses
its discretion to temper rules of law with fairness.
In United States v. Ruggiero,138 the court reversed one defend-
ant's RICO conviction because it was unable to tell from the jury's
verdict whether the jury's determination of guilt rested on at least
two legally sufficient predicate acts. 3 9 In ordering a new trial on the
RICO count, the court suggested the trial judge "request the jury to
record their specific dispositions on the separate predicate acts
charged, in addition to their verdict of guilt or innocence on the
RICO charge."' 40 Such a practice avoids automatic retrials and "fa-
cilitate[s] sound management of judicial resources."''
violation of the 8th amendment.
136. Id. at 181.
137. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. at 176.
138. 726 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 923; see, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 851-52 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 30 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982).
141. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 923; see also United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638,
648 (3d Cir. 1988) (after returning a guilty verdict on the RICO substantive count "the
Recently, the Sixth Circuit, in Callanan v. United States,142 had
to decide whether to vacate a RICO conviction when several of the
defendant's mail fraud convictions, which also served as predicate
acts of the RICO conviction, were reversed. No special verdicts were
used by the trial court. However, the court concluded that "other
verdicts of the same jury may serve the function of special verdicts
on the predicate acts, where those other verdicts necessarily required
a finding that the RICO defendant had committed the predicate
acts. ' 143 For example, if a codefendant is convicted on at least two
counts of bribery which involved the defendant and these same two
counts were also charged against the defendant as RICO predicate
acts, the court may assume that the defendant's RICO conviction
also rested on the same "pattern of at least two predicate acts of
bribery.
144
Given the multitude of theories and predicate offenses asserted in
RICO cases, special verdicts are a more appropriate procedural tool
than general verdicts. They should be utilized in all cases in which a
RICO count is involved rather than just in criminal forfeiture cases
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e).
C. Congressional Reformation of RICO
The RICO debate has shifted from the courts to Congress mainly
because the "judiciary is a somewhat artificial turf for the philosoph-
ical contest that is the heart of the controversy."'r As recently as in
1984 and in 1986, Congress enacted substantial amendments to
RICO, generally expanding its breadth. For instance, the definition
of racketeering activity was expanded to include "tampering with a
witness, victim, or informant"; "retaliating against a witness, victim,
or informant"; "laundering of monetary instruments"; "engaging in
monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity"; "prohibition of illegal gambling businesses"; "any act
which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act"; and many other things.'46 In section 1963, subsec-
tions (d) through (m) were added to sharpen the government's tools
for fighting organized crime.147 Changes were made to enable courts
district court asked the jury to return to the jury room and designate on a special verdict
form which of the charged acts of racketeering they had unanimously found each defend-
ant committed").
142. 881 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1989).
143. Id. at 234.
144. Id. at 235.
145. Venue of the Debate Shifis from the Courts to Congress, Nat'] L.J., Aug. 26,
1985, at 24 (concentrating on the civil RICO arena and concluding that Congress must
determine if the problem of white-collar crime requires a federal remedy).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
147. Id. § 1963.
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to enter restraining orders; "require the execution of a satisfactory
performance bond";148 or order "any other action to preserve the
availability of property . . . for forfeiture." These changes permit
the United States to seize property without notice or opportunity for
a hearing if proper conditions are met.149 Additionally, they enable
the admission of evidence otherwise inadmissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence and authorize the Attorney General to seize all
property forfeited upon such terms as the court deems proper. 150
The preceding amendments and many others afford the govern-
ment stronger procedural tools to fulfill Congress's intent to eradi-
cate organized crime. Moreover, several bills recently have been in-
troduced in Congress which would strengthen RICO further on the
criminal side.' 5' Since the trend is to strengthen RICO, it seems
148. Id. § 1963(d)(1).
149. Id. § 1963(d)(3), (e).
150. Id.
151. S. 413, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S2395 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
1989) ("§§ 656 and 657 (financial institution misapplication and embezzlement) ...
and § 1344 (financial institution fraud)" would be added to the predicates for violation of
the RICO); S. 438, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.,' 135 CONG. REC. S1652 (daily ed. Feb. 23,
1989) (adds a number of new predicate offenses dealing with terrorism and organized
crime and also extends the international service of process); S. 2485, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., 134 CONG. REc. S7446 (daily ed. June 8, 1988) (The Minor and Technical Crimi-
nal Law Amendments of 1988).
§ 154(f) increases the maximum penalty under the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1963(a), for cases in which the maximum penalty for one of the underlying
predicate RICO acts of racketeering is life in prison. The penalty under RICO
would be raised in such circumstances. Currently, RICO carries a uniform
maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. In many RICO cases, this pun-
ishment does not fit the crime. For example, in the Angiulo and LCN "Com-
mission" cases, the defendants committed several murders which would have
been punishable by life imprisonment under state law. A similar sentence for
such crimes under RICO is available only if the defendant is convicted of mul-
tiple counts and consecutive sentences are imposed. This amendment remedies
this deficiency by elevating the maximum penalty for RICO offenses to life
imprisonment where the underlying acts are crimes punishable by life impris-
onment or death.
Id. at 7450; H.R. 1203, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H1203 (daily ed. Mar.
29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Ridge regarding Pornographic Mail Prohibition Act) (Act
will subject civil defendants to a fine of $25,000 and such a violation would be defined as
"racketeering activity" and would be subject to RICO forfeiture penalities); S. 2205,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., 34 CONG. REc. S3131 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1988) (discusses Cali-
fornia and New York's proposed anti-gang legislation which is patterned after RICO,
"such state RICO statutes will enable prosecutors to seek longer prison terms for gang
leaders convicted on other charges"; S. 1203., 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 133 CONG. REC.
S6449 (daily ed. May 14, 1987) (letter from Sen. Robert Dole to U.S. Sec. of State &
U.S. Pres.) (regarding the Anti-Terrorism Act; asks for an authoritative administrative
position on whether the PLO office is subject to the RICO Act); S. 13436, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess.; 134 CONG. REc. S13436 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Heinz in
likely that Congress would favorably consider the codification of the
Peacock rule or the utilization of jury special verdict forms.
V. CONCLUSION
Organized crime poses a serious threat to legitimate business
152
and to society as a whole. It warrants resort to extraordinary mea-
sures and novel sanctions. Courts have repeatedly upheld RICO con-
victions in the face of criminal defendants' arguments that RICO's
cumulative and consecutive sentences, special forfeiture provisions,
and strong penalties are unconstitutional. Moreover, Congress con-
tinues to increase the number of offenses which may be the basis for
a RICO offense. There are current legislative efforts to increase the
possible penalty to life imprisonment in certain circumstances. While
commentators express concern about a need to curb RICO's breadth
on the civil side, this does not appear to be the case on the criminal
side.
Congress should easily be able to address the issues raised in this
Comment, especially when so many changes are being implemented
in RICO. RICO was designed as a tool to help untie the hands of
the government in prosecuting organized crime. However, in prose-
cuting a case in a Brown (minority) jurisdiction, the government is
currently unreasonably restricted. The government must elect be-
tween seeking a conviction under RICO, which includes the risk of
losing the RICO conviction if any one of a number of predicate of-
fense is reversed on appeal, or not seeking the RICO conviction at
all. Surely, such a Hobson's choice does not coincide with the con-
gressional intent to provide new procedural tools to aid in the prose-
cution of organized crime.
Codification of the Peacock rule would eliminate this problem. If
the defendant is charged and convicted of substantive counts, which
also constituted the predicate offenses for the RICO conviction, then
the RICO conviction should remain valid if at least two of the sub-
stantive counts remain in effect after appellate review. This is so be-
cause the verdict still indicates that the jury found the defendant
guilty of at least two racketeering acts related to the enterprise. It
does not matter whether these two acts were related to each other
support of child protection & obsenity amendments to S.2033: a legislative package in
which child pornography would be made an offense under RICO).
152. One court stated:
Although it is clear that infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime
was a primary concern of Congress in enacting RICO, we join every other
circuit which has considered the issue in concluding that [RICO] . . . is not so
limited, and that its prohibitions apply to the use of racketerring activities to
promote any enterprise affecting interstate commerce.
United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980).
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because the statute only requires that the acts be related to the
enterprise.
However, if Congress is' unwilling to go this far, it should at least
require special verdicts in all criminal RICO cases. Such a require-
ment provides advantages to the government and defendants alike. It
eliminates the uncertainty as to specifically which acts the jury
thought were related to the enterprise and which acts the jury relied
on as the basis of the RICO conviction. Special verdicts and specific
findings do not usurp the jury's function because the jury still would
be instructed on each specific requirement of a RICO conviction and
it would still have the ability to temper rules of law with fairness on
each issue. Additionally, special verdicts would clarify the issues for
the jury and help eliminate prejudicial spillover when the jury thinks
the defendant is an exceptionally bad person.
The trend is to utilize special verdicts, even though defendants are
being denied certiorari in cases in which the trial court's jury re-
turned only a general verdict. This is unfair to the defendants who
are prosecuted in the Peacock jurisdictions because their counter-
parts in the Brown jurisdictions are getting their RICO convictions
reversed. Such unevenhanded administration of the law is unfair.
Moreover, it may cause forum shopping by prosecutors with cases
involving large multidistrict enterprises153 spanning jurisdictions
which apply both the majority and minority views. It is also unfair to
the prosecution which has to bear additional burdens since convic-
tions perfectly lawful in some circuits are routinely reversed in
others. Since the Supreme Court has been unwilling to act on this
issue, Congress should consider implementing the preceding solutions
to eliminate this split among the federal circuits.
DEBRA L. WEBER
153. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976). The term "enter-
prise" is broadly defined and is not restricted solely to legitimate business enterprises.

